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Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Wie durch R. Hahn (1984) gezeigt wurde, kann Marktmacht eines Unternehmens
auf einem Markt für handelbare Eigentumsrechte und daraus resultierende Wohl-
fahrtsverluste dadurch gemindert werden, dass dem Unternehmen freie Allokati-
on an Emissionsrechten in vollem Umfang zugewiesen wird. In diesem Arbeitspa-
pier wird ein alternativer Ansatz zur Linderung von Marktmacht vorgeschlagen.
Falls eine Regulierungsbehörde nicht die volle Menge an Zertifikaten an ein Un-
ternehmen mit Marktmacht frei zuteilen kann oder möchte, kann sie alternativ die
globale Emissionsbegrenzung (cap) anpassen um die Ausübung der Marktmacht
zu unterbinden. Durch Anpassung des caps kann ein Zustand erreicht werden in
dem das Unternehmen mit Marktmacht einen Preis wählen wird, der dem Preis
unter vollständigem Wettbewerb entspricht. Als Ergebnis daraus kommt es zu ei-
ner Angleichung der Grenzvermeidungskosten der regulierten Unternehmen und
das Regulierungsziel kann zu geringstmöglichen Kosten erreicht werden.
Falls der cap effizient gewählt wurde, so dass Grenznutzen und Grenzkosten der
Regulierung angeglichen sind, wird eine Änderung des caps zu einem Verlust an
sozialer Wohlfahrt führen. Um diesen Effekt zu kontrollieren, wird der Schaden ei-
ner Änderung des caps mit dem Nutzen der Begrenzung von Marktmacht abgewo-
gen. Dadurch wird eine zweibeste Lösung als Reaktion auf Marktmacht in Märkten
für handelbare Eigentumsrechte für den Fall abgeleitet, dass das Regulierungsziel
ein soziales Optimum darstellt.
Non-Technical Summary
As shown by R. Hahn (1984), free allocation to a firm with market power equal
to the amount of permits the firm uses in a competitive equilibrium can prevent
welfare losses under market power. In this paper an alternative option to mitigate
market power is proposed. If the regulating authority is unwilling or unable to
hand out ’full’ free allocation to a firm with market power, it may alternatively
alter the economy wide emissions constraint (cap). Changing the cap can lead to
a situation where the firm with market power will choose a price similar to the
competitive equilibrium. As a consequence, marginal abatement costs of regulated
firms are equated and the least cost solution is achieved.
If the cap is chosen efficiently, so that marginal benefits and marginal costs of re-
gulation are equated, changing the cap may decrease social welfare. To account for
this effect, marginal social damages from changing the cap are balanced to mar-
ginal gains from mitigating market power. By doing so, a second-best solution to
mitigate market power in permit markets is derived.
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Abstract
As shown by R. Hahn [6], free allocation equal to the amount of permits a firm with market power
uses in equilibrium, can prevent welfare losses. If the necessary amount of free allocation is not
provided to the firm with market power, a second best solution is obtained where marginal abate-
ment costs of regulated firms are not equated. In this paper, it is proposed that the government may
change the economy wide emissions constraint (cap) as a response to market power, e.g. when free
allocation cannot be adjusted. Changing the cap can lead to a situation where marginal abatement
costs are equated in the presence of market power. Because changing the cap will lead to changes of
social welfare, both effects must be balanced. It is shown that there exists a second best social opti-
mum by balancing the positive effect of limiting market power and the negative effect of changing
the cap.
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1 Introduction
As argued by Hahn [6] and generally believed in the literature, adjusting the free allocation
of a firm with market power under tradeable permits is the only way to eliminate neg-
ative impacts (i.e. welfare losses) of market power in permit markets. Using a two-firm
model with a dominant firm and a price taking firm, where firms have explicit unrestricted
emissions (emissions without regulation), it is shown in this paper that by adjusting the
overall emissions constraint (cap), market power can be eliminated. The model is also able
to reproduce the result of Hahn [6], that by adjusting free allocation of the dominant firm,
market power can be eliminated. If the overall emissions constraint (cap) was chosen op-
timally, i.e. so that overall marginal control costs and overall benefits from regulating the
externality are equated, adjusting the cap will decrease social welfare. To account for this
effect, the negative consequences of adjusting the cap are balanced by the positive effect
of mitigating market power. Given an optimal choice of the overall emissions constraint
(cap), adjusting the cap can never deliver a first-best solution. Therefore, adjusting the free
allocation is the only efficient way to eliminate negative impacts (i.e. welfare losses) of
market power. However, by changing the cap a second-best solution could be obtained,
e.g. if policy makers are unable or unwilling to hand out full free allocation to a firm with
market power.
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2 The Model
As described by Hahn [6] and in a similar way by Sinn & Schmoltzi [14], polluters may
have market power in the permit market. While price taking firms minimize costs under
regulation subject to the quantity of abatement (or quantity of emissions), firms with mar-
ket power minimize costs subject to the permit price. In contrast to Malik [10], firms are
compliant1. Assuming a simple abatement cost function, the model of Hahn [6] can be de-
scribed in a simple two-firm setup.
Abatement costs for firm i are dependent on the quantity of abatement qi ≥ 0 and technical
abatement costs αi > 0. Abatement costs are given by
ci =
1
2
αiq
2
i . (1)
Firm 1 has power on the permit market while firm 2 is a price-taker. Firm 2 minimizes
costs by choosing a quantity of abatement q2 given the observed permit price p. Each firm’s
unconstrained emissions are q0i and freely allocated permits are ai. Firm 2 minimizes costs
C2 by solving the problem
min
q2
[
1
2
α2q
2
2 + p(q02 − q2 − a2)
]
. (2)
Equating marginal abatement costs to the price per unit output yields the optimal quantity
of abatement of firm 2. The price-taking firm’s reaction function to the permit price is given
by
q2 =
p
α2
. (3)
Firm 1 has power on the permit market and chooses a permit price that minimizes costs
given the reaction of firm 2 and given that the overall quantity constraint Q is met. Firm 1
faces the problem
min
p
[
1
2
α1q
2
1 + p(q01 − q1 − a1)
]
(4)
s.t. q1 = q01 + q02 − q2 −Q. (5)
Substituting (5) into (4) yields firm 1’s overall costs given its market power
Cˆ1 =
1
2
α1
(
q01 + q02 − p
α2
−Q
)2
+ p
(
q01 − (q01 + q02 − p
α2
−Q)− a1
)
. (6)
Deriving for p, equating to zero, and resolving for p yields the price firm 1 will choose
under market power
pˆ =
α2 ((q01 + q02)α1 + (a1 + q02)α2 −Q (α1 + α2))
α1 + 2α2
. (7)
1This implies that there is no cheating and non-compliance, because a) firms are properly monitored so that
all emissions are reported and b) firms surrender permits equal to the amount of emissions.
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Firm 2 as price taker generates abatement qˆ2
qˆ2 =
pˆ
α2
. (8)
Firm 1 delivers the abatement volume qˆ1 that is required to meet Q = qˆ1 + qˆ2.
If there was no market power, both firms would equate marginal abatement costs. Under
the condition that the overall quantity constraint Q must be met, the price in a competitive
setup would be
p∗ =
Qα1α2
α1 + α2
. (9)
Corresponding abatement volumes (if there is no market power) are given by
q∗1 =
Qα2
α1 + α2
(10)
q∗2 =
Qα1
α1 + α2
. (11)
A third party with zero emissions owns a number of A = Q − a1 − a2 permits, sells the
entire contingentA to the market and behaves as price taker. The third parties revenues are
R = Ap. (12)
Total costs are aggregated technical abatement costs and can be expressed as
C = C1 + C2 −R. (13)
The simple model is able to reproduce the results of Hahn [6]. The price under market
power pˆ will be lower (higher) than the competitive price p∗ if firm 1 receives less (more)
permits for free than it needs for compliance. The price under market power is equal to the
price in a competitive situation if the amount of freely allocated permits to firm 1 equals q∗1 .
Figure 1 shows the consequences of market power on permit markets. Assuming that
revenuesR raised by the third party are redistributed so that it leaves the costs of producing
Q unaffected, the resulting welfare loss under market power and a manipulated price of
pˆ is CDF compared to the first best case without market power where marginal abatement
costs are equated at price p∗ in point C.
3 Economic Efficiency and Market Power
Hahn [6] has claimed that ’the only case in which the marginal cost of abatement will equal the
equilibrium price is when firm 1’s distribution of permits just equals the amount it chooses to use’
and that it is necessary ’to pick an initial distribution of permits for firm 1 which coincides with
the cost-minimizing solution’ to avoid negative consequences of market power. However, in
the model presented above, there exists a set of possible situations where market power
cannot be exerted successfully. To identify these sets, the cost minimizing price under
perfect competition p∗ is equated to the price under market power pˆ. If the government is
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Figure 1: Welfare consequences of market power assuming that the firm with market power receives less permit
for free than it needs for compliance and, as a consequence, chooses to set a price pˆ < p∗.
able to choose one ore more variables in Equation (9) and (7) exogenously, it might be able
to detain firm 1 from exerting its market power.
Qα1α2
α1 + α2
=
α2 ((q01 + q02)α1 + (a1 + q02)α2 −Q (α1 + α2))
α1 + 2α2
. (14)
Assuming that the government is unable to influence (private) abatement costs αi or unre-
stricted emissions q0i without generating considerable private costs (e.g. by restricting firm
i’s output) or public expenditures (e.g. by R&D subsidies), the only remaining option is an
adjustment of the economy wide emissions constraint Q. Solving (14) for Q yields
Q¯ =
(α1 + α2)((q01 + q02)α1 + (a1 + q02)α2)
2α21 + 4α1α2 + α
2
2
. (15)
The model properties regarding free allocation as described by Hahn [6] and others can be
reproduced by solving (14) for a1
a¯1 = Q− q02 + (2Q− q01 − q02)α1
α2
+
Qα1
α1 + α2
. (16)
Equation (16) shows that if the regulating authority has chosen free allocation to the firm
with market power so that it minimizes or removes market power and the regulating au-
thority changes the overall cap, it also has to adjust free allocation to the firm with market
power.
The assumption of perfect markets for permits and final goods is not an innocent one as
a large body of literature confirms. Apart of market power, transaction costs [15, 7] and
asymmetric information can lead to situations where the final allocation of abatement ef-
forts is not independent from free allocation. Also power in markets for final goods can lead
to distortions in the permit market. As Hintermann [9] has shown, permit allocation even
below the one proposed by Hahn [6] may lead to negative consequences on permit markets
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Figure 2: Competitive price and price under market power dependent on the overall emissions restriction Q for
given values of αi, q0,i, and a1. The competitive price p∗(Q) is generally upward sloping in Q, while
the price under market power pˆ(Q) is generally downward sloping.
when power on markets for final goods is considered. Even if perfect markets are assumed,
governments may carefully use the instrument of free allocation because of resulting wel-
fare transfers from consumers to producers, also called windfall profits [2, 16, 5, 8]. Depen-
dent on the principles that allocation decisions are based on, the risk of generating perverse
incentives for regulated firms might exist [12]. Free allocation further decreases the options
for revenue recycling (e.g. lowering existing taxes and decrease deadweight losses) and
may have negative welfare consequences [4, 13, 3].
When adjusting a1 appears to be an problematic choice to impede firm 1 from exerting mar-
ket power, adjusting Q could be an alternative option. Under the assumption that Q is an
optimal choice by the social planer, increasing or decreasingQwould reduce social welfare
by increasing negative impacts from external effects on the society while in the same time
social welfare is increased by the reduced capability of firm 1 to exert market power.
A marginal benefit function (MAB) similar as in Mandell [11] is assumed, with f as a pos-
itive constant and −g as the marginal rate in which the damage from emitting q01 + q02 is
reduced
MAB = f − gQ. (17)
Pareto efficiency would be achieved if MAB are equated to aggregated marginal costs
(MAC). Aggregated costs (for the case without market power) are derived by substitut-
ing (10) and (11) into (1) for i = 1, 2 and summing up both terms
c1 + c2 =
Q2α1α2
α1 + α2
. (18)
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Deriving by Q yields the aggregated MAC, which coincides with (9) because p∗ equals the
MAC in the least costs case [1]. Since it represents aggregated marginal costs in the absence
of market power it is labeled with a asterisk
MAC∗ =
Qα1α2
α1 + α2
. (19)
Equating MAC∗ and MAB and resolving for Q yields the social optimal amount of aggre-
gated abatement Q∗
Q∗ = − f (α1 + α2)
gα1 + gα2 − α1α2 . (20)
By changing Q, two types of effects occur. First, the price under market power pˆ moves
closer to a price p∗ as Q goes to Q¯ (Eq. 15). Second, as Q goes to Q¯ it may move further
away from the social optimal level Q∗. While the first effect increases welfare by weaken-
ing market power the second effect decreases welfare for obvious reasons. A ’second best’
social optimum under market power is achieved where marginal welfare increases from
the first effect equal marginal welfare decreases from the second effect.
The damage caused by market power when choosing a certain Q is
DM =
 q
∗
1∫
0
c′1 dq1 +
q∗2∫
0
c′2 dq2
−
 q1∫
0
c′1 dq1 +
q2∫
0
c′2 dq2
 (21)
DM =
1
2
(
−q21α1 − q22α2 + α1 (q∗1)2 + α2 (q∗2)2
)
. (22)
Substituting q∗i and qˆi into (22), deriving for Q, equating to zero and solving for Q yields
the marginal damage from market power for changes of Q
MDM =
((q01 + q02)α1 + (a1 + q02)α2)
(
α21 + 3α1α2 + 3α
2
2
)
(α1 + 2α2) 2
+
Q
(−α21 − 3α1α2 − 3α22) (α21 + 3α1α2 + 3α22)
(α1 + α2) (α1 + 2α2) 2
.
(23)
The damage caused by moving away from the pareto efficient volume of abatement is
DP =
Q∗∫
Q
MAB dQ−
Q∗∫
Q
MAC dQ (24)
DP =
(Q−Q∗) (−2f (α1 + α2) + (α1α2 + g (α1 + α2)) (Q+Q∗))
2 (α1 + α2)
. (25)
Substituting (20) into (25) and deriving byQ yields the marginal damage caused by moving
away from Q∗
MDP = +Q
(
g +
α1α2
α1 + α2
)
− f. (26)
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Equating MDM and MDP and resolving for Q yields the second best ammount of Q where
the negative effects of market power and from the deviation from the social optimal Q∗ are
balanced
Q¯∗ =
f (α1 + 2α2)
2 + ((q01 + q02)α1 + (a1 + q02)α2)
(
α21 + 3α1α2 + 3α
2
2
)
α31 + 6α
2
1α2 + 13α1α
2
2 + 9α
3
2 + g (α1 + 2α2)
2
. (27)
If the government is unable or unwilling to a1 = q∗1 (handing out full allocation to the dom-
inant firm) as a countermeasure to market power, it may alternatively vary Q according to
(27) to obtain a second best social optimum.
4 Conclusion
Hahn [6] and others have stated that the only way to neutralize the negative consequences
of market power on permit markets is to freely allocate an amount of permit to the firm
with market power that coincides with the amount of emissions it chooses in (a partial)
equilibrium. This paper does not contradict the findings by Hahn [6] and the related liter-
ature but augments the discussion.
In this paper it was shown that apart of choosing the allocation, choosing abatement costs,
unrestricted emissions, or the cap on emissions can lead to situations where the firm with
market power is impeded from exerting its power. While abatement costs or unrestricted
emissions cannot be chosen externally in practice, the government might be able to change
the cap on emissions. As Baumol & Oates [1] have argued, environmental targets (i.e. the
cap) are often chosen based on ’standards’ which are seen as appropriate but ’[. . . ] will
not, in general, result in an optimal allocation of resources’ in a pareto efficient sense. If the
cap would have been set as ’standard’, varying the cap could be an option to improve the
standard given the existence of market power.
If an optimal allocation in a pareto efficient manner shall be achieved, varying the cap
(i.e. moving away from the social optimum) will decrease social welfare. However, if the
government is unable to change a predetermined number of freely allocated permits so
that market power is eliminated it will lead to a second best situation where adjusting the
cap could increase welfare. By balancing the negative impact from changing the cap to a
second best one and the positive effect of confining market power, adjusting the cap could
increase the overall efficiency of environmental regulation under market power.
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